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Appropriation For Instream Flow Maintenance:
A Progress Report On "New" Public
Western Water Rights
A. Dan Tarlock*
Three years ago I published an Article in this law review enti-
tled Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in
Western Water Law.' In 1975 the dedication of water to instream
uses such as fish and wildlife maintenance and recreation was a
growing but still minor factor in western water law. The question of
whether instream uses would be recognized in the prior appropria-
tion and western riparian systems was open. The Article argued that
these new uses were entitled to equal weight with the conventional
beneficial uses. Since 1975, it has become clear that instream uses
will be recognized in western water law. Instream withdrawals2 are
a potential major constraint on the use of water for energy conver-
sion since the dedication of water for instream uses has become an
important factor in water allocation and planning in the Far West.
The issues are now how and to what extent these new uses will be
recognized. This Article carries forward the analysis of instream use
recognition and protection. Post-1975 developments are emphasized
while enough background is provided to point out to the general
reader the important steps in the evolution of this most significant
development in western water law.
In the Far West a water iight is based on the use of water to
satisfy basic human needs or to produce goods and services valued
in the market.3 Prior appropriation has always been a relatively
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Of Counsel: Kutak, Rock & Huie,
Omaha, Nebraska. This Article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Rocky Moun-
tain Mineral Law Foundation's Institute on Water Acquisition for Mineral Development held
in Tucson, Arizona, March 16-17, 1978 under the title New Public Western Water Rights:
Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance. This revised version is printed with the per-
mission of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.
1. 1975 UTAH L. REv. 871.
2. "Withdrawal" and "reservation" are two terms derived from public land law that
are often used to describe the means of recognizing instream uses. A withdrawal is a decision
which closes public land to entry or mineral location pending final classification. Reservation
has a less precise meaning but implies a permanent decision classifying public land for a
single purpose such as a national park. See 1 AMERIcAN LAw OF MINING § 2.1 (C. Martz ed.
1960). In this Article I have used the term withdrawal to describe any recognition of instream
uses since the net effect of a recognition will be to deny the use of the flow to consumptive
use appropriation.
3. "The right is a practical one. It is not a personal right or an incident of land owner-
ship to be exercised at will; for if the water is not used, the right never comes into existence;
and if it is once used, the right can be lost if the use is discontinued." P. MAXFIELD, M.
DIErERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL REsouRCES LAW ON INDIAN LANDs 209 (1977).
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utilitarian doctrine because the mission of regional settlement and
development mandated an attempt to promote maximum utiliza-
tion of water resources. This goal has been accomplished by accord-
ing security to priority, limiting speculative claims, promoting
widespread access to the resource, and prohibiting arguably waste-
ful uses, although maximum utilization of water has sometimes
given way to distributional goals.4 The reservation of large quanti-
ties of water in place was thought to be inconsistent with the goal
of maximum utilization because a reservation in place was simply
not a "use" as the custom of the region had come to define the term.
Reservation in place smacked of the inefficient common law of ri-
parian rights, and the law of prior appropriation consistently sought
to purge western water law of riparian elements precisely because
of the tension between utilitarian and non-utilitarian principles in
the common law.5 Specifically, the recognition of rights to the flow
of the stream apart from a consumptive use and the confinement of
rights to the ownership of land along a stream were thought to be
detrimental to the development of this region. In the famous case
of Schodde v. Twin Falls Water Co.,I the United States Supreme
Court rejected the claim that an appropriation included a right to
the flow apart from the amount applied to a beneficial use. Plain-
4. For example, to achieve a fair distribution of water rights, inefficient means of use
have been protected. The most celebrated example is the doctrine which charges carriage
losses against the junior appropriator's share when a senior makes a call. State ex rel Cary v.
Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940). Recently, one state held that carriage losses
equalling 5/6 of the appropriated flow are not a beneficial use, Erickson v. Queen Valley
Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 678, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971), but Cary would still seem to be
good law in many states. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
579 (1971). The impact of the drive for water conservation on inefficient use practices is
discussed at notes 119-23 infra and accompanying text.
5. For a useful historical analysis of the evolution of the tension between utilitarian and
non-utilitarian principles, see Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property
in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248, 251-78 (1973). The common law of
riparian rights protects only private rights since one must own land adjacent to a stream to
qualify as a riparian. The right to flows for instream uses has been recognized under the
natural flow theory, Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967),
and rejected under the reasonable use theory, Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212
N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43 (1938). Arguments have been advanced in those states that recognize
riparian rights that the state could assert its riparian status to require minimum flows for
lands such as parks owned by the state. See Garton, South Dakota's System of Water Man-
agement and Its Relation to Land Use and Economic Development, 21 S. DAKoTA L. REv. 1,
35-36 (1976). However, in all western states except California and Nebraska, riparian rights
have been cut back to those actually put to a beneficial use on a certain date. 5 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS? § 429.1 (R. Clark ed. 1972). Thus, unless it is held that establishment of a
park or a related land use is a riparian use, riparian rights to future flows would seem possible
only in California and Nebraska.
6. 224 U.S. 107 (1912). See 2 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 210-11 for a more extended
discussion of the decision.
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tiff's assertion that he had a right to the flow of the Snake River to
lift a proportionately small quantity of water for a consumptive use
was rejected because it was wasteful compared to other potential
claims. Schodde is the leading precedent for the rule that the reser-
vation of large quantities of water in place is not a use for which an
appropriation can be made.7
It is a slight exaggeration to assert that instream uses have not
been recognized in western water law for there has always been
limited recognition of these uses, although not on the scale contem-
plated today. The right to appropriate just the amount of water
necessary to support a commercial pleasure ground was recognized
as early as 1913,8 and Oregon began to withdraw streams from ap-
propriation in 1929. 9 But these reservations remained secondary to
the promotion of the use of water for agricultural, mining, and mu-
nicipal purposes, and the amounts withdrawn did not often compete
with consumptive use claims. Today instream use withdrawals are
increasingly based on the ecological and philosophical arguments
advanced by environmentalists that large ecosystems be preserved
in some state of equilibrium. Withdrawals for this purpose require
much larger quantities of water than do withdrawals to preserve
selected scenic waters and the geographic scale of these withdrawals
is, of course, broad. As a result, traditional consumptive use appro-
priators must now face a new competing use of already scarce west-
ern waters.'0 The net result of new state and federal statutes and
precedents supporting the recognition of instream uses is that an
energy developer contemplating an appropriation package must
now consider these "new" public water rights as a significant con-
straint on the use of water for mineral exploitation." For example,
flow appropriations may place a floor on the amount of water avail-
able for application to conventional beneficial uses; a state may
compete with energy developers for unappropriated flows as is now
occurring on the Yellowstone River in Montana; and instream flow
maintenance conditions may control the operation of federal, state,
7. Courts have allowed appropriations for stock watering to be perfected by use of the
stream in place, i W. HuTcnuNs, supra note 4, at 591-96, but these "natural" diversion cases
are consistent with the non-recognition of instream flow preservation rights because water is
removed from the stream. All the courts have done is to allow a traditional diversion to be
made without the wasteful expense of the construction of artificial diversion works.
8. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
9. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 279, 1929 Or. Laws 301 [codified in OR. REv. STAT. § 538.110
(1977)].
10. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CRITICAL WATER PROBLEms FACING THE ELEVEN
WESTERN STATES 80-81 (Apr. 1975).
11. See, e.g., Loble & Loble, The Rocky Road to Water for Energy, 52 N. DAKOTA L.
REv. 529 (1976), reprinted in 13 PuB. LAND REsoURcES DIG, 334 (1976).
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and private water projects. Further, the federal government is
claiming the right to establish minimum flows on public lands
under the reserved rights doctrine.
This Article surveys western state laws and federal laws and
procedures which recognize and protect instream flow rights. Its
thesis is that instream uses are entitled to equal footing with the
traditional consumptive beneficial uses, but that these new uses
should be recognized and protected only as public rights.' 2 Further,
whenever possible, flow preservation,'" recognition, and protection
should occur within state-created appropriation systems pursuant
to strict legislative standards. The public is entitled to the with-
drawal of flows for instream uses, but energy developers are equally
entitled to notice of state and federal claims and to have them
established by standards which subject instream use claimants to
the same anti-waste and anti-speculative policies to which other
appropriators are subject. Energy developers and environmental
interests must share the western waters available for new uses as
widespread access to waters by diverse user groups should remain
the cardinal policy of western water law.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF INSTREAM PRESERVATION
In 1973, the Final Report of the National Water Commission
recommended "that State laws should be improved to provide
greater protection of social values in water." Specifically, the Com-
mission urged that legal rights should be creited for the benefit of
the public "for such social uses as aesthetics, recreation, fish and
wildlife propagation."" The Report is likely to influence considera-
bly the future of state and federal laws. The Commission's recom-
mendation rests on diverse reasons which reflect four decades of
12. This is also the conclusion of the NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR
THE FUTURE 273 (1974) (final report, 1973). However, a California Superior Court has held that
a private organization has standing to apply for an instream appropriation for the "exclusive
public use of protecting fish and wildlife." California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., Civil No. 233933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento, Nov. 4, 1977). See A. SCHNEIDER,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSTREAM WATER USES IN CALIFORNIA 63-71 (Governor's Commission to
Review California Water Rights Law, 1978).
13. Discussions of instream uses often use the term "minimum flows," but the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service has developed a standardized nomencalture that uses the
term "preservation flow" and this Article adopts that terminology. Preservation flows are
defined as "that range of flows within a stream required to preserve the existing levels of fish,
wildlife, other aquatic organisms and related recreational activities." Minimum flows are
defined as the lowest recorded discharge over a specified period of time. Arnette,
Nomenclature for Instream Assessments, in METHODOLOGIES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
STREAM RESOURCE FLOW REQUIREMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT (C. Stalnaker & J. Arnette eds. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as METHODOLOGIES].
14. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 271.
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criticism of federal and state water policies. On a general level, the
recommendation reflects a societal attitude that human activities
should be conducted more in harmony with natural systems than
has been the case in the past. On a more concrete level, it recognizes
the need to preserve fish and wildlife habitats, to enhance food
supplies, and to provide diverse recreational opportunities. The rec-
ommendation also accords weight to the economic and engineering
arguments which have been advanced against large scale water re-
sources projects. Each of these reasons, of course, is debatable, but
for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that each provides a
sufficient justification for the state's decision to recognize these
uses.'" The important question is whether instream public rights are
discretionary with the states or whether, in some cases, recognition
is mandatory. Part I argues that instream values are discretionary
with the state and thus are not fundamental constitutional or natu-
ral rights. The source of the state's power to withdraw waters in
order to recognize instream uses is the state's quasi-sovereign power
over its natural resources.'" The exercise of this sovereignty must
always be discretionary for, absent a constitutional provision, the
state cannot be estopped in the exercise .of its police powers.
Most contemporary environmental theories are utilitarian and
thus are consistent with the discretionary basis of the state's power
to protect environmental values. They assert that resource alloca-
tions for environmental reasons such as instream uses are valuable
to man. In the past decade, society has incorporated these argu-
ments into resource allocation processes in two stages. First, it was
established that environmental values were entitled to equal weight
with non-environmental values. Second, as society. gained a greater
appreciation of the benefits of diversity in natural ecosystems, ac-
tivities which threatened to degrade the environment had to assume
a high burden of justification in contrast to the historic placement
of the burden on those opposing an activity. 7 But utilitarian based
theories of environmental protection do not deny the value of alter-
native resource uses. The opportunity cost of a withdrawal is always
a relevant factor to be considered. These theories assert only that
non-economic costs, as they have traditionally been defined, should
be fully taken into account in all decision-making. This can be done
15. For a more extended discussion of the justifications for state recognition of instream
uses, see Tarlock, supra note 1.
16. Georgie v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
17. See Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some
Criticisms, 50 INr. L.J. 426 (1975);'Tarlock, A Comment on Meyers'Introduction to Environ-
mental Thought, 50 IND. L.J. 454 (1975).
No. 2]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
on a case-by-case basis or on a per se level, such as wild and scenic
river programs. Consistent with this analysis, the new environmen-
tal laws are ultimately procedural for they require only a good faith
weighing of environmental and non-environmental values by an
agency or a legislature; no a priori weight is assigned to one set of
values over the other until the legislature chooses to rank the com-
peting values. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is a
prime example of this theory.'8
There are, however, non-utilitarian theories of environmental
protection which assert that environmental values are paramount to
non-environmental ones. These theories rest on assertions of natural
or constitutional rights which require the incorporation of radical
new philosophical premises into the law. One non-utilitarian theory,
for example, proceeds on the assumption that inanimate objects
have rights. One Idaho environmental attorney asserts that: "It is
just as logical to recognize the right of animate and inanimate ob-
jects to an adequate instream flow of water to a national forest as
on an Indian reservation."' 9 This argument is bad economics and
bad philosophy. As John Passmore has suggested, "[i]f it is essen-
tial to a community that members of it have common interests and
recognize mutual obligations then plants, animals and soil do not
form a community. . . . The idea of 'rights' is simply not applica-
ble to what is non-human."2 Other non-utilitarian theories attempt
to surmount the objections to animism by arguing that the Consti-
tution protects natural objects in order to reinforce paramount so-
cietal values. One philsopher has argued:
Our proposal is this: We have an obligation to protect natural
environments insofar as we respect the qualities they express. We
have seen that these qualities do actually belong to some environ-
ments, which are their paradigms; and the discovery or identification
of these qualities is effected in our language and by our arts. Preserv-
ing an environment may be compared to maintaining an institution,
for symbols are to values as institutions are to our legal and political
life. The obligation to preserve nature, then, is an obligation to our
cultural tradition, to the values which we have cherished and in terms
of which nature and this nation are still to be described. It is difficult
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970).
19. Reed, Should Rivers Have Running? Toward Extension of the Reserved Rights
Doctrine to Include Minimum Stream Flows, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 153 (1975). The article is based
on STONE, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 450 (1972).
20. J. PASSMORE, MAN's RESPONSIBILrrY FOR NATURE 116 (1974) (emphasis in original).
This masterful book is a most lucid and balanced discussion of the case for discretionary
recognition of environmental values.
216 [1978: 211
PROGRESS REPORT-WATER RIGHTS
and indeed unnecessary to argue that fulfilling this obligation to our
national values, to our history, and, therefore, to ourselves, confers
any kind of benefit; perhaps fulfilling a responsibility is itself a bene-
fit, but this view requires not that we define "responsibility" in terms
of "benefits", as the utilitarian does, but that we define "benefits"
in terms of "responsibilities". In any case, preservation of the quali-
ties, and accordingly the values, that this nation, as a nation, has
considered peculiarly its own - and these are the qualities of nature
- certainly obliges us to do otherwise than follow our pleasure and
our profit. Consequently, there may be reason to think that fidelity
to our historic values imposed both a "benefit" and a "cost. 21
This argument by a non-lawyer is bad constitutional law, although
it may be ingenious philosophy. Serious students of constitutional
law have concluded that the primary function of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution is to prevent malfunctions in
the democratic process. 2 Environmental degradation is not a case
where a powerful majority is attempting to deny a powerless minor-
ity access to the political process to claim its share of public bene-
fits. For this reason, it is hard to conclude that the Constitution
contains a sufficient ranking of the competing values at stake in
environmental controversies to allow the courts to define fundamen-
tal rights.
This brief discussion of the philosophy of environmental re-
source allocations will, I hope, put to rest the naive and romantic
arguments that "we" have a right to these uses which can contradict
a legislative or administrative refusal to recognize them. Taken as
a whole the laws this Article surveys increasingly accord instream
uses equal footing with traditional beneficial uses and require the
state to justify a refusal to recognize them; but the laws do not and
should not afford more, for otherwise the real opportunity cost of
these uses will be ignored and the ability of western water law to
incorporate these new uses in a manner which will be tolerable to
existing users will be lost.
II. INSTREAM FLow PRESERVATION STANDARDS
The procedures and standards used for the establishment of
preservation flows are important to lawyers. These flows are estab-
lished by standards which are based on debatable technical and
21. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 265 (1974).
22. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning
From Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975). See also Hanks & Hanks, The Right To A
Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTs OF AMERIcANS: WHAT THEY ARE - WHAT THEY SHOULD
BE (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
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policy judgments, and thus the standard setting process is open to
challeige in appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings.
The work of the Cooperative Instream Flow Group established by
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in 1975 will substan-
tially influence the standard setting process tlhrough the assembly
of information and the development of preservation flow methodolo-
gies. 2 But it is important to realize that existing preservation flow
methodologies do not answer many of the important questions
which will concern lawyers. For example, they neither assess "the
magnitude and range of effects resulting from a series of changes in
discharge through a natural stream channel" nor do they address
"the cumulative effects of permanent reductions of augmentations
in flows." 4 This section of the Article summarizes the assumptions
behind current instream flow preservation methodologies.
Flow preservation standards measure the hydraulic and hydrol-
ogic components of stream flow and focus on maintaining the hy-
draulic and associated stream parameters necessary to meet a given
objective. Stream velocity is generally acknowledged to be the most
important limiting factor on the life stages of aquatic organisms,
and it is widely assumed that flows sufficient to maintain fish,
aquatic insects, and riparian vegetation are adequate proxies for all
other instream uses. Species preservation is increasingly being ac-
cepted as a legitimate proxy for environmental damages generally,
as the Endangered Species Act25 illustrates, for focusing on the sur-
vival of endangered species avoids the hard questions that more
philosophical discussions of the virtues of preserving natural envi-
ronments must confront. But the use of fish and wildlife proxies
must be accepted with extreme caution because the existence of an
ecosystem carries with it no moral imperatives. 26 The decision to
base an environmental allocation decision on fish and wildlife prox-
23. In 1976, the group published a series of papers, in METHODOLOGIES, supra note 13,
which summarizes the literature on instream flow methodologies, and is an invaluable start-
ing point to understand both the technical and judgmental aspects of preservation flow
standards. The purpose of the study is to advise those setting flow standards, but the papers
contain a balanced presentation of the strengths and weaknesses of present methods.
24. Stalnaker & Arnette, Methodologies for Determining Instream Flows for Fish and
Other Aquatic Life, in METHODOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 132.
25. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), has been
interpreted to impose a substantive duty upon federal agencies to insure that their actions
do not jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species or modify or destroy a critical
habitat. Thus, existence of an endangered species or critical habitat in the path of a federal
water resources project may make it impossible to build the project as planned. Hill v.
T.V.A., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). See Note, Obligations
of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REv.
247 (1976).
26. Meyers, supra note 17, at 439-45.
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ies is therefore open to question.
Preservation flow requirements vary with the time of the year
and the reach of the stream. In states which give explicit weight to
water quality enhancement and recreation, the preservation flow
requirements will vary as to these uses of the stream .27 Most metho-
dologies, however, focus on fishlife maintenance. Preservation flow
calculation methodologies have been developed in each area of the
country and necessarily vary according to local conditions. 28 Be-
cause flow needs vary according to the reach of the stream, the next
stage in the standard setting process is to identify critical areas of
the stream. Transcet measurements of hydraulic parameters and
subjective evaluations of stream cover are used to relate stream
habitat loss to stream discharge reductions. Aesthetic measure-
ments can also be added to this procedure.29 Spawning areas require
special calculations. Depth-velocity criteria are the most important
factors in the establishment of spawning discharge flows. 30 Incuba-
tion and rearing flows follow from these calculations.
Reliance on the developing preservation flow establishment
methodologies gives withdrawal quantification decisions an aura
of objectivity, but of necessity the formulas are quite arbitrary, even
27. Stalnaker & Arnette, supra note 24, at 89.
28. The following method was one developed for the Northern Great Plains area:
The first step in this method assembled all available flow data for the streams
under consideration and segregated the information by calendar month. Mean dis-
charge for each month was computed. When a normal distribution for flow data (over
years) was evidence, the "t" statistic was used in establishing an upper and lower limit
for the mean monthly values. From initial testing on several stream reaches (relatively
stable over years), it was found that 70 percent of the yearly flows for a given month
clustered about the mean and are considered as representative of average hydrologic
conditions. The 30 percent of recorded flows lying outside the range were eliminated
and assumed to represent abnormally high and low flows. When a normal distribution
of flow data was not evident, abnormally high and/or low values were arbitrarily
eliminated. The second step arrays, from the highest to the lowest, remaining daily
values for a particular month for all the years of record. This results in a flow duration
curve for the month in question. This process is repeated for each month of the year.
The recommended instream flow was set at that flow exceeded 90 percent of the time
as determined from the flow duration curves for each month of the year. This flow is
referred to as the 10 percentile flow. This technique resulted in a series of monthly flow
estimations. The third step divided the stream into sections based upon tributaries
entering, or diversions leaving, the reach being examined, and additions or subtrac-
tions from the 10 percentile flow were made according to the volume of flow in the
tributaries and/or diversions. Lastly, adjustments were made upwards for spawning
times, for the period of spring runoff (May, June and July when the mean annual flow
of record was recommended, and for ease of operation [e.g. 105, 95 and 100 would be
adjusted to 100 for three months]).
Id. at 90-91.
29. Masteller, Andrews, Langord & Madsen, Measurement of Streamflow Aesthetic
Values, in METHODOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 187.
30. Stalnaker & Arnette, supra note 24, at 102-10.
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accepting the legitimacy of fish and wildlife proxies. The formulas
make the heroic assumption that there is a correlation between
historic flow conditions and the conditions necessary for species
survival. There may, in fact, be a correlation in many cases; but
more site specific ecological studies must be done before it is possi-
ble to predict the impact of incremental flow reductions on species
survival. The significance of this defect in existing flow methodolo-
gies has become apparent in the Yellowstone Basin withdrawal
hearings."1
The State of Washington adds even more subjective parame-
ters. Aesthetics, water quality, and navigation are used to rate
streams, and summer flows are determined by the importance rat-
ing of the stream. It has been noted that "[t]his concept is appar-
ently functional in a 'water-right' state; however, in arid regions, a
more technical, less subjective approach may be needed."32 Flows
to maintain fishlife, for example, may be less than those necessary
to meet minimum aesthetic protection and enhancement standards.
III. ELIMINATION OF PER SE BARRIERS To FLOW PRESERVATION
APPROPRIATIONS
Part I argues that the law of prior appropriation as reflected
in state constitutions, statutes, and judicial precedents permits in-
stream use appropriations; that the reasons for the refusal to recog-
nize these appropriations are no longer applicable; and that in-
stream uses are presumptively beneficial. For years it has been as-
sumed that the elements of a valid appropriation are (1) notice of
an intent to appropriate; (2) an actual diversion; and (3) an applica-
tion to a beneficial use. The actual diversion requirement has histor-
ically barred instream appropriations. Substantial doubt has also
existed as to whether instream flow uses are beneficial, 3  but courts
have not had to reach this issue because appropriators could not
overcome the actual diversion requirement.34 The law of property
has moved beyond reduction to possession by capture as the basis
for a right. Capture theories can now only be justified if a reduction
to possession requirement serves some clearly articulated resource
31. See notes 110-14 infra and accompanying text.
32. Stalnaker & Arnette, supra note 24, at 94.
33. However, it is doubtful that these uses were ever non-beneficial. See, e.g., Empire
Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
34. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158
Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965). See Ellis, Watercourses - Recreational Uses for Water Under
Prior Appropriation Law, 6 NAT. RESOUaCES J. 180 (1966); Comment, The Prerequisite of a
Man-Made Diversion in the Appropriation of Water Rights - State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Miranda, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 170 (1973).
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allocation function. Most western water experts agree that the ac-
tual diversion requirement serves no function that cannot be served
by other water law doctrines and statutory procedures. Thus the
real issue is whether the;e uses are beneficial. In light of the modern
and widespread appreciation of instream use values, it can no longer
be argued that instream uses are per se grossly inefficient and thus
should be denied in favor of other claimants such as energy devel-
opers. Because water is scarce in the West and must be shared
among diverse users, the states have always asserted the right to
determine who can use how much. Private rights remain the founda-
tion of western water law, but these rights are subordinate to collec-
tive allocation decisions which reflect a societal consensus about the
optimum use of a state's water resources.15 So long as vested rights
remain unimpaired, a state may exercise its police power to decide
among whom water should be allocated. A state may choose be-
tween public and private allocations and between instream and
traditional consumptive uses. Thus a state can withdraw all of the
water from appropriation and reserve it for instream uses; it can
appropriate the water itself for beneficial uses; or it can choose to
rely upon private initiative operating within state designated
ground rules. For these reasons, instream uses should be valid with-
out the requirement of an actual diversion, and these uses should
be presumed beneficial. The amount of water needed to support a
use is always subject to judicial review or to administrative evalua-
tion when other users claim that the use is non-beneficial. The
standards states are using to make the determination that an in-
stream use is benefical are discussed in Part IV.
If this analysis is correct, the only possible barriers to the recog-
nition of instream flow rights are either state constitutional provi-
sions which provide that the right to appropriate shall never be
denied, or judicially recognized anti-speculative policies which
would block large scale withdrawals. Both of these possible objec-
tions were addressed and rejected in an instructive case, State De-
partment of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water Administration.6
35. See Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1 (1965).
36. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974), noted in Comment, Instream Appropriation for
Recreation and Scenic Beauty, 12 IDAHO L. Ray. 263 (1975). Accord, McClellan v. Jantzen,
26 Ariz. App. 223, 547 P.2d 494 (1976). In State Department of Parks, narrow statutory
authorization to appropriate specific springs was before the court, but the opinion's broad
analysis of the objections suggests that instream uses will not be held per se inconsistent with
the appropriation system and that state flow preservation procedures will be upheld in the
far West.
No case, however, has yet upheld an instream appropriation absent a statutory authori-
zation, and a California trial court has recently held that the State Water Resources Board
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In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court considered Idaho Code Sec-
tion 67-4307 which allowed the state to appropriate certain unap-
propriated waters in Malad Canyon, Idaho. The legislature had
declared the use of these waters beneficial dnd had determined that
the public use of the waters was of greater priority than any other,
save domestic uses. All parties conceded that there were unappro-
priated waters so the issues were whether the state could appropri-
ate the springs, whether the use of the waters for recreation and the
preservation of scenic beauty was beneficial, and whether there
could be a perfected appropriation in the absence of a physical
diversion.
State agencies in the West have traditionally appropriated
water for state institutions, including parks, as well as for ultimate
consumption by agricultural users and municipalities.3 7 State ap-
propriations in California, for example, are an integral part of state
water planning because they insure that water will be used in a
manner consistent with the goals of the state water plan. In Idaho,
however, there was contrary precedent." Intervening water users
associations in State Department of Parks argued that state appro-
priations were inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of the
right to appropriate because such appropriations represented "an
insidious scheme in an attempt to monopolize the state's unappro-
priated waters or to condemn already appropriated waters. '3 The
court rejected the monopolization argument because the waters
would be available downstream which suggests that this challenge
might be more persuasive where large quantities of water are in-
volved and users in the basin of origin are precluded from appropri-
ating the water. But the logic of the state's right to appropriate
should overcome these objections for states have powers - subject
to express constitutional and statutory constraints - to develop and
may reject a public instream use appropriation because the appropriation lacks possession
of the water. Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., Civil No. 61136 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Humboldt County, Nov. 3,1977). The California State Water Resources Board rejected
the appropriation application of the Department of Fish and Game not on the ground that
an appropriation requires a diversion from the stream, but on the ground that dominion and
possession over the water is needed. For example, if the water had been stored, the Board
would have found possession. There are many statements in western water law that a right
depends on the reduction of water to possession. The Board relied upon 2 C. KINNEY, IRRIGA-
TION AND WATER RIGHTS § 719 (2d 1912). However, appropriate rights have always been
usufructory and not based on ownership or possession of the corpus of the stream so the issue
should be whether an instream use is a beneficial use, not whether the appropriation has
possession or dominion.
37. 1 W. HuTcHINS, supra note 4, at 250-51.
38. State Water Conservation Bd. v. Enking, 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936).
39. 530 P.2d at 927.
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implement comprehensive water resource management programs
and scale is no barrier to implementation of a program which in-
cludes protection of preservation flows.
One dissenting justice was sympathetic to the monopolization
argument. Justice McFadden first made the technical argument
that water for instream uses could not be appropriated because the
state would not be acting in a proprietary capacity. "If the state
were to hold unappropriated waters in trust for these purposes, it
certainly would not be acting in a proprietary capacity; it would be
doing nothing more than it already has the duty to do in its sover-
eign capacity. "4 Because the state has the right to use public waters
for a beneficial use "it cannot 'acquire' a right that it already has. " 4'
The flaw in this logic is the conclusion that the power to withdraw
water from appropriation and the power to make an appropriation
are separate and mutually exclusive. The distinction between sover-
eign and proprietary powers stems from the nineteenth century
when settlement of the West was the primary land and water policy.
Government property rights were seen as inconsistent with the pro-
motion of widespread access to natural resources because public
property rights were "a prerogative for the advantage of the govern-
ment as distinct from the people. 4 2 Justice McFadden appreciated
the weakness of his technical argument, for his major contention
was that the Idaho Constitution denies the state the power to re-
serve water for public instream uses to the exclusion of prior appro-
priators.43 Justice McFadden would, somewhat surprisingly how-
ever, allow the state to deny a conventional appropriation which
impaired scenic values by concluding that the use was not benefi-
cial. While the statutes of a number of western states allow the
denial of appropriation permits where a proposed use is deemed not
in the public interest, Idaho's permit statutes make no provision for
such consideration, 44 although there is no state constitutional bar-
rier to legislation allowing public interest denials.45 A more telling
objection to the argument is that it is undesirable to limit the state
40. Id. at 936.
41. Id.
42. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
43. This objection is well answered by Justice Bakes' concurring opinion. See notes 46-
48 infra and accompanying text.
44. Clyde, Legal Overview - Current Problems in WaterAcquisition, in WATER AcQuns-
TON FOR MINERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTIuTE 2-10 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Foundation, 1978). See
also Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910); Big Horn Power Co. v.
State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
45. See Comment, Idaho - The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Permit System and
Denial of a Water Use in the Public Interest, 4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 48 (1969).
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to this method. When a state files for an instream use, it has made
the decision that this use of the water is the highest beneficial use.
Direct filings are a preferable method of making this judgment be-
cause uncertainty is decreased and other claimants are thereby
given notice that water in a particular reach of the stream will be
unavailable for appropriation.
In State Department of Parks, classification of instream uses as
beneficial was opposed on the grounds that the Idaho Constitution
lists five uses and only these five can be beneficial. More generally,
it can be asked whether the reservation of a large quantity of flow
can ever be beneficial in light of the consistent rejection of a right
to the flow as an incident of an appropriative right. The majority
held that the use was beneficial on the grounds that (1) the Idaho
Constitution establishes only a preference system, not an exclusive
listing of beneficial uses, and thus the state is free to recognize new
valuable uses of water; and (2) there was no basis to disturb the
legislative judgment that the use was beneficial. In a. concurring
opinion, Justice Bakes advanced a narrower ground for classifying
the use as beneficial which gives energy appropriators, for example,
a basis for challenging a public instream appropriation. By analogy
to the cases holding that an excessively wasteful use is not benefi-
cial, Justice Bakes asserted that the court is always the final arbitor
of whether a use is beneficial and can weigh the reasonableness of
each use:
I would restrict today's holding to the narrow proposition that
the use before us is beneficial so long as, and only so long as, the
circumstances of water use in the state have not changed to the
extent that it is no longer reasonable to continue this use at the
expense of more desirable uses for more urgent needs . . .. This
supports the legislative determination that non-consumptive appro-
priations of water in natural waterways for scenic and recreational
purposes, among others, can under proper circumstances be a benefi-
cial use .... 4
Although this reasoning gives insufficient deference to the legisla-
tive judgment and represents an assertion of a power beyond that
customarily exercised by courts in beneficial use disputes, it cor-
rectly recognizes the need to subject instream uses to standards.
Courts have assumed that an actual diversion is a necessary
condition of a valid appropriation, either because state constitu-
tions authorizing appropriation incorporate the diversion require-
ment or because the policy promoted by the requirement is essential
46. 530 P.2d at 932.
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to carry out the purposes of the appropriation system. The latter
argument can be easily rejected. The purpose of the actual diversion
requirement was to impart notice to subsequent appropriators.
Modern filing systems - imperfect as they are - now perform this
function better than the actual diversion requirement does. A
stronger policy behind the doctrine might be the prevention of mon-
opolization and, for this reason, it could be argued that the actual
diversion requirement is a constitutional one; but three justices of
the Idaho Supreme Court agreed that the actual diversion require-
ment was not a constitutional one. The majority in State Depart-
ment of Parks simply asserted that an actual diversion was not
required by the language of the state's constitution that "the right
to divert shall never be denied" and that the requirement had been
expressly eliminated by Idaho Code Section 67-4307. Justice Bakes
suggested a better and more general rationale: state constitutional
provisions sanctioning private appropriations were meant to assert
the rejection of the common law of riparian rights." There is a
certain irony in using this argument to re-inject the most obnoxious
element of riparianism - the natural flow theory - into western
water law, but the reasoning Justice Bakes used to sustain the stat-
ute is right: Where an appropriator does not require a diversion to
make an appropriation effective and beneficial, there appears to be
no practical reason to require a diversion. Non-constitutional argu-
ments that the law of prior appropriation does not allow the use of
water for speculative purposes are often urged,4 but these are not
applicable to instream uses. Again the relevant issue is whether the
use is beneficial. The general power of courts to review the amounts
used in addition to state statutes and procedures giving content to
the reasonableness requirement are sufficient checks on the power
of the state to maintain preservation flows at the expense of other
water claimants.
IV. FLOW PRESERVATION STRATEGIES
Richard Dewsnup and Dallin Jensen have recently completed
a survey of state laws which protect instream flows. 9 The classifica-
tion of the instream use recognition and protection strategies this
Article will follow is adapted from their very useful paper. Instream
47. Id. at 933-34.
48. See Montana Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Intake Water Co., 558
P.2d 1110 (Mont. 1976).
49. R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, STATE LAWS AND INSTREAM FLows (March 1977) (prepared
for Western Energy and Land Use Team, Office of Biological Services, Fish and Wildlife
Services, U.S. Dep't of Interior) (Contract No. 14-16-0008-2120FWS).
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uses can be protected directly in the following ways:
(1) Direct legislative withdrawl of certain waters from appropria-
tion such as federal and state wild and scenic river programs;
(2) Expanded legislative and judicial definitions of navigability to
limit withdrawals which impair the navigable capacity of a river;
(3) State agency filings for instream flow appropriations on the
state or on designated waters;
(4) Instream flow use considerations mandated as part of state ap-
propriation license proceedings or state water planning generally;
(5) Consumptive use and storage appropriation permits subject to
instream flow preservation conditions; and
(6) Federal flow preservation on withdrawn lands through assertion
of reserved rights.
Instream use recognition and protection can also be accom-
plished by direct private purchases of water rights for instream
purposes as well as by a number of indirect methods which adapt
traditional water law doctrines by disallowing selective appropria-
tions. As examples of indirect methods, Dewsnup and Jensen list
restrictions on transfers, limited term permits, demands of greater
diligence in completing appropriations, imposition of more stringent
criteria on large applications, and water conservation requirements
which mandate the consideration of re-use alternatives prior to tap-
ping new supplies. Because these strategies are indirect, however,
their use to promote instream uses might so distort traditional water
law that the costs of using this strategy would far outweigh the
gains. The remainder of this Article will concentrate on the direct
methods of recognizing and protecting instream uses. Attention will
also be given to the impact of the growing federal and state insist-
ence on more efficient water use patterns as a prerequisite for ac-
quiring new rights on instream use recognition. This indirect means
of flow preservation may be a significant factor in future conflicts
between energy and environment.
Because the strategies outlined by Dewsnup and Jensen overlap
to some extent, the following discussion is organized into five parts:
A. Wild and Scenic River Programs and Federal Reserved Rights;
B. Expanded State Definitions of Navigable Waters; C. Public In-
terest Qualifications on Appropriation Applications; D. Direct State
Instream Use Filings; and E. Water Conservation Programs.
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A. Wild and Scenic River Programs and Federal Reserved Rights
In 1968, Congress passed the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,5" and
several states have since enacted their own river preservation acts.
These acts have two purposes: the prevention of impoundments and
other diversion works and the control of the land along the river
corridor. The designated river stretches have generally been con-
fined to the upper reaches so few conflicts among prior right holders
have arisen. Thus, although it has not been necessary to develop a
clear water rights theory of the basis for withdrawing and reserving
water from appropriation, the statutes are clearly valid. At the state
level, wild and scenic river programs are exercises of the state's
police power. In the West, the federal government has the authority
under the property power to withdraw water for these purposes and
may also have the authority to set preservation flows on streams not
included in the federal act. Fortunately, to date, the placement of
a river in a state or federal wild and scenic rivers system can be
viewed as a prospective rather than a retroactive constraint on the
use of water; but the importance of these acts in water use contro-
versies is just beginning to be appreciated.
California 51 and Oregon 52 have enacted legislation following the
federal model. Even prior to the adoption of its act, Oregon had a
long history of withdrawing specific streams from appropriation.53
California's wild and scenic rivers legislation designates five specific
streams, declares that preservation of them "is the highest and most
beneficial use and is a reasonable and beneficial use of water within
the meaning of Section 3 of Article XIV of the State Constitution," 54
and prohibits impoundments and other diversion works on the des-
ignated streams. Both California and Oregon provide limited diver-
sion exceptions. California water users in the area of origin may tap
the stream for domestic purposes provided that the Secretary of the
Resources Agency determines that the water diversion is necessary
to supply domestic needs and will not adversely affect the free flow-
ing condition of the river. Oregon allows withdrawals for domestic,
municipal, and livestock uses on selected creeks. Designation of a
federal or state wild and scenic river would seem clearly to preclude
energy development that is dependent on the supply of water or the
50. Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976)).
51. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50-.65 (West Supp. 1978). A California attorney gen-
eral's opinion defines a prohibited project as any construction or planning activity which
could have any adverse effect on the free flowing condition of the river, even though such
project is not located on the river. 60 OF. A'ry. GEN. 4 (1977).
52. OR. REv. STAT. § 390.805-.925 (1977).
53. See OR. REv. STAT. § 538.110-.300 (1977).
54. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.50 (West Supp. 1978).
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reach of the river. Designation also limits the right to use the river
for waste disposal.
In 1976, a substantial number of western rivers were added to
the federal system.5 There are a number of stages from initial sur-
vey to legislative classification, when a river can be included in the
system. Only two stages, however, preclude the construction of di-
version or impoundment works on the river. Either a river must be
designated by Congress as part of the system or Congress must have
designated it as a study river. Study river designation effectively
freezes new development, pending a final determination on inclu-
sion.56
Federal legislation rests on the power to assert reserved water
rights necessary to support the use for which land was withdrawn
from entry. The water must be used on the withdrawn land to sup-
port the original purpose of the withdrawal. Water can be with-
drawn for environmental purposes and there is no balancing of fed-
eral need against state created rights if the state rights were created
subsequent to the date of the withdrawal. 7 The major issue in the
West is not the federal government's power to claim reserved water
rights for wild and scenic rivers, but the priority date of the reserved
right. Fairness suggests that state created expectations should only
be denied when the claimant was given notice of the federal govern-
ment's intent to assert a superior power, and thus the date of desig-
nation of the river should be the priority date of a wild and scenic
river.5
In addition to reserved right claims to support wild and scenic
rivers, the federal government can claim the right to set preserva-
tion flows on any withdrawn lands if these flows are included in the
purpose of the withdrawal. In Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v.
Salopek, 5 the United States Forest Service asserted the right to set
minimum flows under the 1897 Organic Act on the theory that the
act established multiple use as the policy of forest management and
that preservation flows are consistent with multiple use. The New
Mexico Supreme Court held that multiple use did not become For-
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1976). Major energy projects on an undesignated river will often
stimulate efforts to have a river designated as a wild or scenic river.
56. See North Carolina v. Federal Power Comm'n, 553 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (state
was proposing a river for inclusion in the federal system as FPC license proceedings were
pending). There were also numerous study river additions in 1977. 16 U.S.C. § 1276 (1976).
57. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
58. See Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REv.
707 (1970).
59. 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1978) (No. 77-510). See Note, New Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation
Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 975 (1976). Accord, Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho
Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9 (Idaho 1978).
[1978: 211
No. 2] PROGRESS REPORT-WATER RIGHTS 229
est Service policy until 1960 and that the original purpose of forest
withdrawals was limited to protection of downstream water users
from flooding and sedimentation. 0 Thus, the court concluded that
a national forest created under the 1891 and 1897 organic acts had
no implied federal reserved rights and that any rights had to be
perfected under New Mexico law. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari and a decision is pending.! 5
Mimbres Valley may be an unduly narrow reading of the re-
served right doctrine since it is seemingly at odds with the Supreme
Court's historic practice of inferring federal intent to reserve from
the broad purpose of the withdrawal. Since Winters v. United
States,61 the Supreme Court has determined the federal purpose not
by analyzing the specific intent of Congress but by determining the
broad federal purpose of the withdrawal.62 Writing for a unanimous
Court in 1976, Chief Justice Burger synthesized the reserved rights
doctrine: "This Court has long held that when the federal govern-
ment withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for
a federal purpose, the government by implication, reserves appur-
tenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accom-
60. The court relied on Izzak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), for
the proposition that the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-538
(1964), supplemented the 1897 legislation. Consistent with this analysis, the special master
in a pending Colorado adjudication of federal reserved rights has ruled that Forest Service
instream uses will have a June 12, 1960 priority date, the date of the enactment of the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified
in 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-38 (1976)). M. WHrrE, PARTIAL MASTER-REFEREE REPORT COVERING ALL
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 4, 1976). Small consumptive
withdrawal rights have been quantified but the preservation flows and lake levels have not
yet been fixed.
60.5. The United States Supreme Court affirmed by a 5 to 4 vote, the New Mexico
Supreme Court's opinion after this article was written. United States v. New Mexico, 46
USLW 5010 (1978).
61. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Indian water rights may also be a source of expanded reserved
rights for instream uses. Under Winters, Indian rights date from the creation of the reserva-
tion and have been measured by non-Indian policies. Now Indian lawyers are arguing that
Winters rights are a substantive bill of environmental and cultural rights for the Indians and
that the rights are measured by historic Indian cultural practices. Thus, the Indians can claim
the right to the whole flow of the stream for uses such as preservation of fisheries resources
and maintenance or restoration of status quo ante generally.
Non-Indian interests wishing to obtain the use of water will be well advised to make
their plans and schedules with an eye towards the unique cultural setting which an
Indian tribe, as a governing entity and potential contracting party presents ....
Prominent in the political make-up of most tribes is a traditional faction which is
generally opposed to economic development ....
Boyden, Use of Indian Water in Developing Mineral Properties, in WATER AcQUISITION FOR
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT INsTrrUTE 5-13 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Foundation, 1978). Cf. Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). See Pelcyger, The
Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. LAW 19 (1977).
62. United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971). See generally Ranquist, The
Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservations of Rights of the Use of Water, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REv. 649.
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plish the purpose of the reservation."63 Under this analysis, it would
be possible to conclude that the policy of multiple use management
has constantly been followed and that instream uses are implied by
a withdrawal for multiple use purposes. Instream uses enhance the
recreational and aesthetic uses of a forest. Subsequent enactments
of express multiple use legislation can be seen as congressional con-
firmation of Forest Service past practices rather than grants of new
management authority."
B. Expanded State Definitions of Navigable Water
Navigable waters have historically been open to members of the
public for water dependent uses. The right to use navigable waters
is the oldest public water right,65 but until recently this right has not
been an important factor in western water law because public rights
were confined to rivers which were commercially navigable in fact.
Outside of the coastal bays of California, Oregon, and Washington,
there are few waters in the Far West capable of supporting commer-
cial navigation. 6 Public navigation rights, however, are no longer
confined to waters which are commercially navigable in fact. West-
ern states are adopting the theory that small streams, where the
beds are privately owned, capable of supporting small pleasure
craft, are navigable and are thus open to the public. Expanding the
historic definition of navigability imposes an easement of passage
against the owner of the bed of the stream and gives members of the
public a privilege of access to overlying waters.
More significantly, the justification advanced by the states for
the public rights of passage may also support limitations on with-
drawals to protect these public rights. Many early cases reasoned
that the riparian right did not include the right to exclude other
riparians or the public; but recent western cases rest the recognition
of the public right on the theory that the state owns the waters in
trust for the public.67 Thus the expanded definitions of navigability
could limit an appropriator's right to call or to make a new appropri-
ation. Navigability has historically been used to define the federal
government's jurisdiction under the commerce clause to allocate
63. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
64. But cf. 13 LAND & WATER L. REv. 501 (1978).
65. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF
83-85 (1847).
66. A discussion of the public trust doctrine as it affects state disposition of tidelands,
private rights of access and rights to fill, public navigation and related rights is beyond the
scope of this Article. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
67. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
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bed titles between the states (and their patentees) and the federal
government (and its patentees), and to determine public rights of
use.68 The first two uses involve federal questions, but once the bed
titles have been allocated between state and federal interests, the
states are free to adopt a rule of public use which deviates from title
rules of bed ownership so long as the federal government's para-
mount authority to regulate commerce is not impaired.69 In choosing
a use rule, a state is exercising the right historically exercised by the
Crown of England which inheres in the states as an incident 6f their
sovereignty. 0 Thus the state may choose to integrate public use
rules into its water allocation law.
At the turn of the century a number of states adopted the "saw
log test" of navigability7' to promote the lumber industry, and this
test has been adapted to the recognition of recreational rights.
Courts in California and Idaho have recently adopted a broader test
of navigability and held that the public can use streams at any point
below the high water mark "which are capable of being navigated
by oar or motor craft."72 The public's rights include boating, fishing,
68. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922). See
generally Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1 (1967).
69. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
70. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 403 (1842). These rights accrued
to the western states under the equal footing doctrine. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 212 (1845). See Shively v. Bowlby, 142 U.S. 1 (1893), for an extensive discussion
of the authorities and the rationale for allocating the beds of navigable water bodies to the
states.
71. The "saw log" test of navigability was adopted by eastern and mid-western states
in the mid-nineteenth century to promote the timber industry. Streams were declared naviga-
ble if logs could be floated on them either continually or seasonably. The recognition and
expansion of this doctrine in Wisconsin is traced in J. HURST, LAW AND ECONoMIc GROWTH
166-69 (1964). An intermediate court of appeals in Michigan rejected the saw log test as the
limit of navigability in 1974. Kelly ex rel MacMillan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 214
N.W.2d 856 (1974), holds that evidence of past use of float logs need not be shown if the river
is capable of being navigated by oar or small craft. However, the Michigan Supreme Court
still applies the narrower saw log test. Piqorsh v. Fahner, 386 Mich. 508, 194 N.W.2d 343
(1972).
72. People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1971); Southern
Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295, (1974). The
Idaho court relied upon Idaho Code Section 36-901 and Section 36-907, which define naviga-
ble fishing streams as those capable of floating six inch longs during the high water season of
the year. A statutory basis, however, is not necessary for a court to adopt the pleasure boat
test of navigability. Picabo also relied on People v. Mack, which states that "[t]he legisla-
ture's failure to include a watercourse within its listing of public waterways does not preclude
adoption of the pleasure boat test of navigability." 19 Cal. App. 3d at 1049, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
453. Cf. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. App. 3d 351, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971), which
said, in dictum, that states may preserve tidelands in their natural state so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments that provide
food and habitat for birds and marine life, and favorably affect the scenery of the area.
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swimming, and hunting. No case has yet held that an existing ap-
propriator must cease or limit his diversion to protect the navigable
capacity of a stream or that a prospective appropriator's application
may be denied for the same reason. However, physical obstructions
which interfere with the public's right of navigation have been en-
joined. For example, in Ritter v. Standal,73 the owners of a fish farm
filled in an estuary in the Thousand Springs area on the Snake
River. The fill prevented riparians from reaching the stream
through the estuary and prevented the public from reaching the foot
of a spectacular falls. The estuary was found navigable, and the fill
was found to be both a public nuisance and an infringement of the
riparian owners' right to "have. . . unobstructed access to the na-
vigable waters along the entire length of their waterfront. ' 74 The
defendants in Ritter argued that classification of the estuary as
navigable abridged their constitutional right to appropriate. Rejec-
tion of this argument by both the trial court and state supreme court
suggests that an appropriation may be denied to protect the naviga-
ble capacity of the stream. 71
There is no reason to distinguish between a fill which impairs
public access to navigable waters and a diversion which interferes
with the public's right to float the stream. Both are instream uses
and the injury to the public is the same in both cases. Further, were
the state to invoke the navigation servitude, the state could curtail
existing diversions without the duty to pay compensation as well as
prohibit new diversions. 76 There are, however, powerful fairness ar-
guments against using expanded theories of public rights to curtail
73. 98 Idaho 446, 566 P.2d 769 (1977). Compare State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.
2d 407 (1974). Landowners developed a bluff over a navigable lake and the resulting erosion
and run-off formed a 6,000-square-foot delta in the lake which allegedly impeded navigation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine only gave the state standing
to sue and did not create a substantive cause of action apart from the common law remedies
the state could assert. Landowners argued that they were exercising their right to dispose of
surface water under the common enemy doctrine, but the supreme court adopted the reasona-
ble use rule and remanded for a trial which would give landowners the opportunity to submit
evidence on the social utility of their conduct. Statutes prohibiting deposits in navigable
waters were found not to be applicable because they contemplated intentional fills.
74. 556 P.2d at 773.
75. The plaintiff's attorney has written:
The water from the spring was unappropriated . . . .If the water had been put in a
pipeline and taken to distant lands, and if it were only water in the estuary, the
appropriation of the water would necessarily have dried up the stream and destroyed
the public's instream uses. However, we were able to avoid that problem in this case,
because the Snake River would have entered the estuary and made it navigable, even
if the spring water had been diverted.
Clyde, supra note 44, at 2-13.
76. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Sibson v. State, 110
N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).
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diversions. The federal and state navigation servitudes can only be
justified, if at all, on the theory that both levels of government have
long put water claimants on notice that private rights in navigable
streams are always subordinate to public rights.77 To extend the
navigation servitude theory to streams which have not been histori-
cally classified as navigable so that rights previously vested under
state law may be curtailed would be to reduce the notice justifica-
tion to an arbitrary fiction.7 Under this analysis, however, the fu-
ture use of navigable recreational streams clearly may be limited,
for western appropriators have always run the risk that an appropri-
ation will be rejected because it is not in the public interest. In
short, expanded definitions of navigability are simply another
method of asserting the public interest limitation on private appro-
priations.
C. Public Interest Qualifications on Appropriations Applications
Because water has always been scarce in much of the West, the
states have long asserted a substantial interest in the uses to which
this resource may be put. The state interest in water extends beyond
the comparatively narrow conservation interests that have been as-
serted against private exploration of both renewable and non-
renewable resources such as timber, oil, and gas. In most states,
appropriation applications may be rejected on the ground that they
are incompatible with the public interest. This power has histori-
cally been used sparingly, for an applicant has only had to prove
77. Modest support for this argument can be found in United States v. Kaiser Aetna,
408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii 1976), which held that the owner of a non-navigable body of water
may subject it to commerce clause jurisdiction by opening it to navigable waters by means
of an artificial channel, but that the water does not become subject to the navigation servi-
tude. Thus, "while Congress may provide for the improvement and regulation of navigation,
and take necessary action to prevent interference or obstruction to navigation, it cannot
impose a public navigation servitude upon such a privately constructed waterway without
paying a reasonable compensation for the use thereof." Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). Kaiser
Aetna, however, is of limited applicability because the water body was non-navigable only
because fishponds subject to tidal flows are private property under pre-annexation Hawaiian
law.
78. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule
of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RasouRcFs J. 1, 24-25 (1963). "To justify the no compensation
rule by the idea of notice of a paramount federal right in navigable streams would require
that navigability be defined as of the time the private right in question was acquired."
Professor Morreale also contends that the recognition of a right to compensation based on
lack of notice is to estop the government from exercising the full reach of its sovereign
authority. Id. at 25. However, this objection proves too much, as the existence of a constitu-
tional right to just compensation forces the courts to distinguish between compensable and
noncompensable exercises of the police power. Thus, recognition of the state's right to redis-
tribute water resources to the public is not inconsistent with compensating those property
owners who were justifiably surprised by the redistribution.
No. 2]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
that unappropriated water is available and that vested rights will
not be impaired by the appropriation. But today the definition of
public interest is expanding. This expansion is being accomplished
in the following ways: (1) environmental values have been added to
the list of relevant criteria in considering appropriation applica-
tions; (2) state environmental policy acts have been held applicable
to water appropriation applications, thereby enlarging the water
agency's jurisdiction for taking public interest considerations into
account; and (3) new interpretations of the scope of the public trust
have mandated greater attention to alternative uses of water includ-
ing instream uses. This section will discuss legislative and judicial
decisions from Utah, California, Washington, and North Dakota
which illustrate these approaches.
1. Utah-In 1943, the Utah Supreme Court rendered a
landmark decision holding that a prior filing could be displaced by
a subsequent one to assure the storage of water in a public project
that would put the water to a higher use. Doubts, however, were
expressed about whether Tanner v. Bacon" allowed applications to
be rejected because instream uses were a higher beneficial use. To
remove those doubts, the relevant statute was amended in 1971 to
allow the state engineer to deny appropriation applications that
would "unreasonably affect the public recreation or the natural
stream environment. ' 80 Since 1971, the state engineer has diligently
considered environmental uses in appropriation applications, but
most surface streams are fully appropriated during periods of peak
demand, so preservation flows are generally not possible to recog-
nize given the necessity to protect vested rights.8' No appropriation
application has been denied under the statute. Flow conditions on
Utah's streams have been improved by the construction of upstream
reservoirs, and flow releases for environmental reasons are requested
in the bargaining between appropriation applicants and the state
engineer prior to project approval. But preservation flows have not
yet been made a license condition of any Utah project.82
2. California-The California Department of Fish and
Game has the right to intervene in State Water Resources Control
Board proceedings,8 3 and the Board has long imposed flow preserva-
79. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Supp. 1977). Similarly, the Washington Supervisor of
Hydraulics is authorized to deny an appropriation application if the withdrawal or storage
would diminish the flow of water needed to maintain fish populations. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 75.20.050 (1962).
81. Telephone interview with Mr. Dee Hansen, Utah State Engineer (Feb. 11, 1978).
82. Id.
83. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243-43.5 (West 1971). See A. SCHNEIDER, supra, note 12, at 30-
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tion conditions on appropriation permits. Storage appropriations
have been conditioned on fish preservation flow releases. Similarly,
direct withdrawals have been conditioned to provide minimum fish-
eries flows.84 These decisions have a firm precedent in western water
law because the right to appropriate is subject to the qualification
that the appropriation be in the public interest. No right is vested
because no expectations are legitimate until this condition is ful-
filled. In the Delta Water Rights5 decision, however, the Board went
beyond its practice of conditioning new uses on the protection of fish
and wildlife and, for the first time, required the release of water
already stored behind Oroville Dam for delivery to Central and
Southern California. The releases were ordered to preserve the
fresh-salt water balance in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The
Board reasoned that various California statutes mandated the pro-
tection of all beneficial uses-including water quality and fish and
wildlife enhancement-in the Delta. This conclusion is significant
but not surprising. The difficult issue is determining who must pay
for the flow releases. Arguably, state water service contract holders
have vested rights in that water behind Oroville Dam necessary to
fulfill their contracts, and at a minimum are entitled to payment
from the Delta beneficiaries or the state generally for the flow re-
leases. The Water Resources Board simply refused to address the
problem, noting only that "hopefully [sic], the legislature and
Congress will give high priority to this matter."8
In California, the current instream use issue is whether the
state can enforce environmental water use permit conditions against
the federal government. This question is now before the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. California.87 It is hoped
that the Court's opinion will clarify the law of federal-state relations
by limiting the federal exemption from state law. In the pending
case, the Bureau of Reclamation filed for direct state permits and
assignments of state priorities to construct the New Melones project
on the Stanislaus River. The State Water Resources Control Board
granted the permits and made the assignments but attached
twenty-five conditions, the most important of which prohibit the
federal government from filling the reservoir until a definite plan for
use of the water is formulated, and limiting the right to store water
56, for a thorough discussion of California law.
84. Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116
Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
85. D. 1379 (California State Water Resources Control Board, 1971).
86. Id. at 16.
87. 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit after this article was written. 46 U.S.L.W. 4408 (1978).
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to four purposes: water quality control, fish and wildlife protection,
power, and recreation. The State of California imposed conditions
because it desired to protect, at least temporarily, a nine-mile
stretch of whitewater, which will be inundated by the dam, and
because the irrigation project, which would have purchased the
water from the reservoir, has not yet been funded by Congress.
United States v. California will require the Court to clarify the
meaning of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which requires
the Bureau to proceed in conformity with state law in constructing
water distribution projects. Until 1958 it was assumed that the
states could veto a federal project if Congress did not specifically
exercise its constitutional power to allocate western waters. Ivanhoe
Irrigation District v. McCracken"8 held that section 8 did not allow
California to distribute water in a manner inconsistent with a spe-
cific federal reclamation policy, the 160-acre limitation. Confined to
this holding, Ivanhoe is a logical and entirely justified application
of federal supremacy principles. In dictum, however, the Court lim-
ited section 8 to defining vested state interests for the purpose of
determining the measure of compensation when the United States
condemns water rights. Unfortunately, this dictum has become
frozen into a rule which reverses the intent of section 8,9 for now
federal law always controls, even if the state policy is not inconsist-
ent with the purpose of the federal project. The better rule, as Dean
Meyers has argued, is that the Secretary of the Interior is presump-
tively bound under section 8 to follow state law, in form and in
substance. The presumption could be overridden, however, by a
provision in the project's authorizing legislation which either explic-
itly or implicitly states a federal objective that would be frustrated
by conforming to state law."0
This rule comports with state and federal efforts to maintain
instream uses. Federal policy is according increased weight to in-
stream uses, and thus state instream use policies ought to be pre-
sumed consistent with federal law. The commerce and spending
powers combined with the supremacy clause give the federal govern-
ment complete authority to override state policy, but there is no
need for the courts to do so where Congress has not recently spoken,
especially with regard to projects authorized when environmental
values were not accorded great weight. The broad reading of
Ivanhoe unjustifiably denies the state the right to redefine its water
88. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
89. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S.
627 (1963).
90. Amicus Curiae Brief of Charles J. Meyers at 4-5, United States v. California, cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 608 (1977) (No. 77-285).
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priorities in situations where no clearly superior federal interest has
been asserted.9
3. Washington-The enactment of state environmental
policy acts has changed the ground rules for the perfection of an
appropriation application by both private parties and public agen-
cies. No longer is it sufficient for a private applicant to show that
there is unappropriated water available and that no vested con-
sumptive right will be impaired. Furthermore, even if the state
water resources agency does not contest the permit on the ground
that the water should be reserved for instream uses, an applicant
cannot be assured that the use permit will be issued. State environ-
mental policy acts impose an affirmative obligation on the state
permit-granting agency to consider reservation as an alternative in
all applications subject to the state's act. As construed by the
courts, this obligation extends to the review of most water right
applications.
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources2 illustrates the
impact of a state environmental policy act. In Stempel, an applica-
tion to appropriate water from a small lake north of Spokane was
challenged by cabin owners on a lake who argued that numerous
pollution problems were imminent if the lake level were lowered
further. The Department of Ecology, successor agency to the De-
partment of Water Resources, concluded that the statutory lan-
guage which required a determination of whether the proposed ap-
propriation would be a "detriment to the public welfare" referred
only to the rights of those who might be injured by withdrawal of
the water (a traditional definition of the term) and that pollution
controls were irrelevant. The Washington Supreme Court, however,
disagreed and held that pollution problems raised by the riparian
owners must be considered. The court further held that the Depart-
ment of Ecology had to file an environmental impact statement on
the basis that the State Environmental Policy Act of 197113 obli-
gated the Department "to consider the total environmental and
ecological factors to the fullest in deciding major matters." 4
Stempel is consistent with the federal precedents which have held
that the National Environmental Policy Act of 196911 broadens the
91. Note, Allocation of Water from Federal Reclamation Projects: Can States Decide?,
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 343 (1974).
92. 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973). See also Note, Maintenance of Minimum
Instream Flows in South Dakota, 23 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 181, 188-90 (1978), for a discussion of
the use of the state's little NEPA as a basis for preserving instream flows.
93. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010 to .910 (Supp. 1976).
94. 82 Wash. 2d at 114, 508 P.2d at 171.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970).
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mandate of federal licensing agencies. 8 If Stempel is followed in
those states with similar acts, any doubts about the state's power
to reserve water for instream uses, pursuant to general statutes per-
mitting public interest denials, will be resolved in favor of expand-
ing "public interest" to include environmental as well as traditional
economic considerations. In addition, the range of factors to be con-
sidered by state agencies in small-scale diversions will be broad-
ened.
Washington is a water rich and resource poor state. The state
legislature has chosen to go further than Stempel by systematically
incorporating preservation flow requirements into all water rights
applications. The Washington Department of Ecology now has the
authority to "establish minimum water flows or levels for streams,
lakes or other public waters for the purposes of protecting fish,
game, birds or other wildlife resources or recreational or aesthetic
values of said public waters whenever it appears to be in the public
interest to establish the same. 97 Subsequent appropriations must
not interfere with established preservation flows. 8
4. North Dakota-Almost all states have some form of
water planning process, and instream uses are often recognized as
an allocation option in planning studies and final plans. If a diver-
sion were inconsistent with a state water planning choice that the
waters be reserved for instream uses, it might be possible to invali-
date a permit application on this ground. State plans, however,
seldom establish allocation priorities with the specificity necessary
to resolve concrete conflicts. Such plans are generally characterized
96. See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 238, 286-97 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1976). In addition, the section provides
that upon a request from the Department of Fisheries or the Game Commission, the Depart-
ment of Water Resources shall "establish such minimum flows or levels as are required to
protect the resource or preserve the water quality described in the request."
A recent study of the Washington procedure reports:
Partly as a result of various time-consuming procedural requirements, the Department
of Ecology has established a minimum flow on only one stream. In an apparent at-
tempt to provide a more expeditious method of establishing desired flows, another
statute was passed. This statute provides that the state must maintain the base flows
of all perennial streams to the extent necessary "to provide for preservation of wildlife,
fish, [WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § §0.54.020 (Supp. 1976)] scenic, aesthetic, and other
environmental values and navigation values." The use of "minimum flow" in the
earlier statute and the use of "base flow" in the latter statute have created a problem
of statutory construction. The Washington Department of Ecology and Department of
Fish and Game have interpreted "base" flow as the flow needed to conserve fish,
aesthetic, and other instream values. They have interpreted "minimum" flow as the
flow needed to enhance these values.
A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 119 (emphasis in original).
98. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.030 (Supp. 1976).
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as advisory and thus have little or no legal weight, except perhaps
in Oregon. 9 Th6 federal and state environmental impact assessment
process is changing this somewhat because discussion of the preser-
vation of a river in its natural state is a required element of a valid
environmental impact statement (EIS), but the EIS process does
not mandate substantive results so states and the federal govern-
ment are free to plan and allocate water as long as there is an
adequate discussion of the preservation option in the EIS .oo Perhaps
to stimulate state planning efforts, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has recently rendered an opinion that judicially imposes a
duty to consider preservation flow needs in state planning and per-
mit granting.
United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Commission ' held that the public trust doctrine re-
quires the state to consider the potential impact of an energy con-
version appropriation application on present water supply and the
future water needs of the state. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin all future
energy conversion appropriation applications until the state pre-
pared a comprehensive long- and short-range plan for the conserva-
tion and development of the state's water resources. Although North
Dakota law requires the preparation of state water plans,12 the court
reasoned that such plans constitute "a significant advisory policy
statement," but do not limit the state's power to grant individual
permits. Therefore the statute provided no basis for the suit.' 3 The
court, however, reached substantially the same result with the
sweeping declaration that the state's discretionary allocation au-
thority is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine. The public
trust doctrine, as ennunciated by the United States Supreme Court
99. State action which conflicts with the state's water policy is unenforceable. ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 536.360, .370 (1977). In the future, increased weight may be given to state plans,
and thus such plans will more directly influence important water allocation decisions. Dallin
Jensen has written: "The preparation of state water plans has formed a significant chapter
in state water resource programs in recent years." Jensen, State Water Law Reforms in Water
Allocation 2, 4 (paper presented at the Conference on Energy and the Public Lands, I, Park
City, Utah, Aug. 1976) (available through the University of Utah College of Law). Jensen
notes that in a number of states the water plan can have a significant impact on future uses
of water. "In certain. . .States, the agency delegated the authority to prepare the water plan
has the means of implementing it. For instance in Nevada and Wyoming, the state engineer
is charged with water right administration and also has the authority to develop a comprehen-
sive water resource plan for the state." Id. at 4. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 532.165 (1973); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 41-1.6, .18 (Supp. 1977).
100. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F. 2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
101. 247 N.W. 2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-26 (Supp. 1977).
103. 247 N.W.2d at 460.
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in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,'"4 prevents the wholesale al-
ienation of tidelands that impair the public's right of navigation.
The doctrine has historically been only a narrow, though significant,
restraint on state disposition of submerged lands. In the past decade
it has been argued that the doctrine extends to all state resource
allocation choices," 5 by imposing a duty upon states to consider the
environmental consequences of important resource use and alloca-
tion decisions. The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted this
theory on the ground that the state holds the waters in trust for the
people of the state.
North Dakota's new definition of the public trust raises the
issue of what resource use choices are now constrained by the trust.
The problem with using the public trust doctrine to structure state
resource allocation decisions is that the history of the doctrine pro-
vides no basis to derive a comprehensive ranking of competing re-
source use values. If the doctrine is to have an impact on water
allocation, the impact must be primarily procedural. The court rec-
ognized this by holding that the trust requires, at a minimum, a
determination of the potential effect of the allocation of water on the
present water supply and long term water needs of the state. This
necessarily involves planning responsibility. 106 Thus, although
United Plainsmen can be read simply as a restatement of the state's
right to deny permits which are not in the public interest, such a
reading is too narrow. The decision adopts a common law environ-
mental impact analysis approach which places a higher burden than
has previously been imposed on the state to demonstrate that it has
considered alternative uses of water before it grants an appropria-
tion permit for energy conversion. 107 The EIS process has focused on
studies justifying specific projects, but the ultimate goal of the pro-
cess is to encourage agencies to take environmental values into ac-
count in the planning process because the potential for accommoda-
tion is greater at the early stages of project consideration. United
Plainsmen has accelerated and strengthened the achievement of
this goal in North Dakota. The case may also provide a basis from
which energy appropriation applications can be attacked because
there has been insufficient consideration of instream use alterna-
tives.
104. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
105. Sax, supra note 66.
106. 247 N.W.2d at 462.
107. North Dakota law requires that instream flow be taken into account in state water
plans. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-28 (Supp. 1977). South Dakota's statute is similar. S.D.
COMPUED LAWS ANN. § 46-17A-14 (Supp. 1977).
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D. Direct State Instream Use Filings.
Two states-Colorado and Montana-presently authorize a
state agency to file for instream use appropriations, and an initia-
tive to allow state filings is being circulated among voters in Idaho.
Colorado's procedure," 8 which is currently being challenged,, 9 func-
tions not so much to reserve water but to preserve the status quo
on certain streams. The state's streams are, in theory, over-
appropriated so a late priority instream use appropriation serves
only to give the state standing to contest changes of use or diversion
point applications which might affect the stream flow. Section 89-
890 of the Montana Code"" provides a procedure for the reservation
of water for all beneficial uses including preservation flows under
standards which give the state virtually unlimited discr6tion to
choose among conflicting allocations, thereby controlling the devel-
opment of a region. In contrast to Colorado, Montana has unappro-
priated waters, and instream use appropriations have become a
major factor in water use conflicts in the Yellowstone Basin.
The Montana legislature imposed a moratorium on water ap-
propriations in the Yellowstone Basin and provided that when the
moratorium ends all reservations will have priority over permits
subsequently issued."' In 1974 all appropriations were frozen pend-
ing a determination of the need for section 89-890 reservations for
instream uses. Thirty applications for agricultural, municipal, in-
dustrial, and instream flow reservations have now been filed. The
Fish and Game Commission has filed for 8.2 million acre feet an-
108. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1973).
109. In re Water Rights of the Colorado Water Conservation Board on behalf of the
People of the State of Colorado in the Roaring Fork River and its Tributaries, Nos. W2720,
W2721, W2776 (Colo., filed June 19, 1975). The tributaries involved are Avalanche Creek and
Crystal River in Pitkin and Garfield Counties, Colorado.
110. (1) The state or any political division or agency thereof, or the United States
or any agency thereof, may apply to the board to reserve water for existing or future
beneficial uses, or to maintain a minimum flow, level, or quality of water throughout
the year or at such periods or for such length of time as the board designates ....
(3) The board may not adopt an order reserving water unless the applicant establishes
to the satisfaction of the board: (a) the purpose of the reservation; (b) the need for the
reservation; (c) the amount of water necessary for the purpose, of the reservation; (d)
that the reservation is in the public interest. If the purpose of the reservation requires
construction of a storage or diversion facility, the applicant shall establish to the
satisfaction of the board that there will be progress with reasonable diligence in accord-
ance with an established plan. (4) After the adoption of an order reserving waters, the
department may reject an application and refuse a permit for the appropriation of
reserved waters, or may, with the approval of the board, issue the permit subject to
such terms and conditions it considers necessary for the protection of the objectives of
the reservation.
MONT. Rav. CODE ANN. § 89-890 (Supp. 1975).
111. Id. at §§ 89-8-103, -105 (Supp. 1975).
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nually at Sidney, Montana, where the Yellowstone flows into North
Dakota. The average annual run-off of the Yellowstone River is only
8.8 million acre feet. The Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation estimates that basically all consumptive reservation
for agricultural and energy development can be satisfied, but that
these consumptive uses must be subordinated to some unknown
degree to the requested instream use appropriations."' For example,
in the Upper Yellowstone Sub-basin, the Commission's reservation
"could virtually eliminate all new full-service irrigation from the
Yellowstone mainstream. Irrigation could expand only if new irriga-
tors would be willing to accept water shortages in the late fall in all
years and most of the season in a few years.""' The EIS prepared.
for the applications delineates many other foregoing alternatives if
the "instream uses option" is adopted.
The general significance of the Yellowstone Basin reservations
proceedings is that for the first time a western state is using its
power to reserve waters for instream uses to protect an existing
basin-wide ecosystem. Previous instream flow reservations have
involved the preservation of selected watercourses which have gen-
erally had a long history of public enjoyment of their natural state.
The Yellowstone Basin reservations proceedings raise a number
of difficult questions which the western states are just beginning to
face. Since the Fish and Game Commission based its proposed re-
servations on the need to preserve an entire river ecosystem by
maintaining the status quo, the reservations are based on historic
seasonal flows and do not reflect any data on the impact of incre-
mental flow reductions on fish and wildlife.' There is no evidence
in the'record which would allow the Montana Department of Natu-
ral Resources to make an informed decision that less water will serve
the purposes of the reservation. Like most state agencies, neither
the Fish and Game Commission nor the Department of Natural
Resources has the technical capability or the financial resources to
gather the ecological information necessary to make such a determi-
nation. The Fish and Game Commission is clearly the appropriate
agency to initiate a reservation because of its statutory duty to
protect these resources; but at some point, instream use withdraw-
als must be integrated into the state's general allocation priorities.
112. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESoURCES AND CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR WATER RESERVATION APPLICATIONS: YELLOWSTONE RIvER 10-13 (Dec.
1976) (draft). In May of 1978 the Department of Natural Resources "recommended that only
4.3 million acre-feet be divided among agencies and cities for purposes that include irrigation
and municipal consumption as well as instream uses." High County News, May 19, 1978, at
13.
113. Id. at 195.
114. Interview with Mr. Henry Lobel, attorney for Intake Water Co., in Tucson, Arizona
(March 16, 1978).
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One step in this direction might be to assign the burden of proof on
the issue of the need to support the reservation to the single purpose
agency. Assignment of the burden of proof, however, is an ineffec-
tive solution where decisions must be made in the face of uncer-
tainty. Because it is not yet possible to project with sufficient preci-
sion the consequences of ecosystem modification, it is justifiable to
give those seeking to protect the status quo some discretion to err
on the side of caution. In the long run the best solution to the
problem lies in state planning programs that classify rivers accord-
ing to their use and thus balance competing demands for water on
a state-wide basis. For example, in Montana most of the energy
development will take place on the Powder River which is quite
polluted, so storing the water for energy development will improve
the quality of the Yellowstone mainstream. Similar trade-offs can
be made in other situations.
An initiative pending in Idaho illustrates the possibility of inte-
grating instream use protection with a state's overall water alloca-
tion policies. As of March, 1978, signatures are being collected to
support the submission of The Hydropower Protection and Water
Conservation Act to the state's voters. One of the major uses of the
state's water is hydropower generation, which requires substantial
regular flows. 15 The pending legislation attempts to link hydro-
power and preservation flow protection. The Hydropower and Water
Conservation Act declares that the use of water in place "for the
protection, use and preservation of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic
life, transportation and navigation, recreation, aesthetic values,
water quality and scenic beauty" are beneficial uses. To protect
hydroelectric generation, the Act would appropriate in trust for the
people of Idaho an amount of 'water "which is equivalent to the
average flow for the month of.August for the five consecutive driest
years between 1927 and 1977, adjusted to conditions of use and
appropriation existing on the effective date of this Act." Building
on State Department of Parks v. Department of Water
Administration,"' the proposed Act would authorize the Idaho
115. Idaho's major water controversy pits hydroelectric power interests against irriga-
tors, and thus allows environmental groups to align themselves with those seeking to promote
hydroelectric power. The state water plan advocated the development of 850,000 new and
250,000 supplemental acres of irrigated land in the Snake River Basin. According to one
economic analysis, "each acre of new irrigated development consumes or prevents the produc-
tion of 6,053 KWH of electricity which would cost $200 to generate by alternative means."
Hamilton, Energy and the Growth of Irrigated Agriculture in Southern Idaho 10 (paper
prepared for the Agricultural Conference of the Idaho Conservation League, College of South-
ern Idaho, Twin Falls, Idaho, Feb. 25, 26 (1977).
116. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). See notes 36-48 supra and accompanying text.
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Water Resource Board to file on unappropriated waters for hydro-
power and environmental instream uses upon a showing that appro-
priation is "necessary to conserve the flow" for these uses. No physi-
cal diversion of water would be required. In addition, the Director
of Water Resources would be given the power to deny appropriation
permits on the ground that they are not in the public interest. Idaho
and its northern neighbor Montana are the only western permit
states which do not delegate this power to the permit granting
agency.
E. Water Conservation Programs
Instream uses can be promoted by water conservation, for every
time water applied to a conventional beneficial use is conserved
more water is made available for instream uses. Financial savings
often provide substantial incentives to conserve, and the Bureau of
Reclamation is beginning to impose conservation restrictions in its
contracts. But in general the law of prior appropriation has always
been reluctant to mandate the conservation of water. The require-
ment that a water right depends upon continuous application to a
beneficial use occasionally prohibits wasteful uses, but beneficial
use has been defined by the custom of the community. This use of
custom protects inefficient carriage and use practices.11 7 Further,
the law provides disincentives to conserve. In most states, an appro-
priator who salvages water may retain the salvaged water; but in
Colorado and Arizona the water returns to the public and may be
appropriated by others."' And, in all states implementation of con-
servation practices may represent a subsequent permanent loss of a
portion of an historic right. An appropriation depends upon use, and
non-used water-for whatever reason-is subject to forfeiture or
abandonment. Despite these formidable barriers to reform, how-
ever, the right to be inefficient appears to be slowly giving way to
the duty to conserve. The Carter Administration threatens to make
water conservation the focus of its federal policy, which means that
the right to receive project water and the funding of federally fi-
nanced projects would be dependent upon the application of higher
levels of technology to conserve water. The technology-forcing poli-
cies of federal air and water pollution legislation might serve as
117. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45
P.2d 972 (1935).
118. South E. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 187 Colo. 181, 529 P.2d
1321 (1975). See generally C. LEE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATER CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 39-
48 (Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, 1977).
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models for a new federal conservation policy."' There also are indi-
cations that the courts may impose some form of conservation duty
by rejecting custom as a defense to waste and by imposing re-use
119. An emerging problem in the West is the relationship between the establishment
of preservation flows and the attainment of pollution abatement policies. The California
Water Resources Control Board imposed flow release requirements in the Delta Water Rights
decision, see notes 85-86 supra, to preserve the salinity balance in the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta. The Montana Department of Health has petitioned the Departmeni of Natu-
ral Resources to reserve some six million acre feet in the Yellowstone Basin for water quality
maintenance purposes.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (1972 Act), 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1973), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977 (1977 Amendments), Pub.
L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), seek to control the discharge of point and non-point
sources of pollutants. Point sources of pollution are subjected to two types of requirements.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has set effluent limitation guidelines which are
applied to discharge permit applicants. A state cannot vary these guidelines on an ad hoc
basis. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). In addition, a discharge
permittee must meet state receiving water quality standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. V
1975). The thrust of the 1972 Act is to reduce pollution by controlling effluent emissions.
Therefore, dilution through flow maintenance is generally not an acceptable abatement alter-
native. In the Far West, however, much pollution comes from agricultural non-point sources.
A "point source" has been defined by regulation to include only return flows from "any dis-
cernible, confined and discrete conveyance from which any irrigation flow is discharged into
navigable waters." 40 C.F.R. § 124.84(a)(1) (1977). Early regulations were invalidated in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975). In the Colo-
rado River Basin, for example, the basin states have been required to set receiving water
quality standards (including numeric criteria) for salinity and a "no salt return wherever
practicable" policy has been established by the EPA. This policy will require substantial
alteration of drainage patterns and the construction of drainage and retention works. For a
discussion of the salinity problem on the Colorado River and the United States' obligation to
deliver usable flows of the river to Mexico, see Dreye, Salinity Aspects of the Colorado River,
15 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 43 (1975); Johnson, Our Salty Rivers: Legal and Institutional Ap-
proaches to Salinity Management, 13 LAN & WATER L. REv. 441 (1978); Weatherford &
Jabocy, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the Colorado River, 17 NAT. REsouRcEs
J. 171, 202-04 (1975). Because the imposition of a no-discharge policy on non-point source
run-offs will be costly to irrigated agriculture and because the elimination of agricultural run-
offs may decrease flows used by vested water right holders, there will be pressures to meet
some receiving water quality standards by maintaining sufficient flows to dilute the pollu-
tants. The EPA is just now coming to grips with the possible tension between federally
mandated water pollution control requirements and water law. The agency is required by the
1977 amendments to the 1972 Act to report to Congress on the conflicts between water quality
and water quantity law. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 5(b), 91 Stat. 1567 (1977). The same section
provides: "It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities
of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superceded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by
this Act." Id. at § 5(a), 91 Stat. 1568 (1977), codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(g) (Supp. 1978).
The Report, due in the summer of 1978, is expected to delineate the direction of federal policy
'with respect to this issue and should provide the states with some basis for deciding the extent
to which instream flow maintenance programs can be used to achieve water pollution abate-
ment objectives. Ultimately a policy must be formulated which allows the states to incorpo-
rate water quality considerations into their preservation flow maintenance programs. Effi-
ciency considerations would dictate that dischargers be given some credit for the dilution
benefits of these flows, but rigid criteria must be established to insure that reliance on
preservation flows does not become a means of avoiding compliance with the no-discharge
goals of the 1972 Act.
UTAH LAW REVIEW
duties on new appropriators. 0
In 1975, an intermediate California appellate court broke new
ground by refusing to dismiss a complaint urging a mandatory con-
servation duty. The Environmental Defense Fund sought to block
a proposed contract between a utility and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion on the ground that the utility's failure to reuse existing supplies
constituted an unreasonable use of water under the California con-
stitutional provision requiring that all waters be put to a reasonable
beneficial use. The California Supreme Court recently reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs could not raise the reclamation issue
because the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required that the issue
first be presented to a regonal water quality board as the State
Water Quality Board and the regional boards were in the process of
developing a state waste water reclamation policy:
Due to the danger to public health and to the problems of feasi-
bility connected with waste water reclamation, the statutory provi-
sions prohibit use of reclaimed waste water until the Department of
Health establishes statewise criteria and the regional boards estahl-
lish reclamation requirements. The careful consideration demanded
by the Legislature prior to permitting reclamation of waste water is
evidenced by its decision to make violations of its statutes criminal.
The broad powers given to boards toward obtaining injunctions and
enforcing compliance with adopted criteria and requirements also
reflect legislative intent to vest regulation of waste water reclamation
in the boards. 2'
The court also rejected the utility's claim that imposition of a state
law duty to reclaim before a utility could contract for federal pro-
ject water was preempted by federal reclamation law so it is only a
matter of time before the duty to reclaim will be raised again, and
a trial on the merits of a reclamation duty will be held. A similar
duty could be imposed under the public trust theory adopted by
North Dakota in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota
State Water Conservation Commission.2 2
Beyond the imposition of judicially-created legal duties to con-
sider conservation alternatives in developing new water supplies,
western states must anticipate that the federal government may
impose higher use conservation standards for delivery of Bureau of
Reclamation project water; set minimum standards for mandated
state water conservation programs as a condition for obtaining fed-
120. Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971).
121. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. 142 Cal. Rptr.
904, 912 (1977).
122. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
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eral funds for water resources projects; and set higher prices for
federal water, which will force users to resort to greater efficiency
in the transportation and application of the water. In short, the
growing concern for water conservation will provide powerful argu-
ments for instream flow proponents to assert against projects pro-
posing'to tap new supplies and against the failure of large users to
recycle existing supplies.123
V. CONCLUSION
This survey illustrates the astonishing extent to which the rec-
ognition of instream uses has evolved within the past five years:
from a secondary factor in western water allocation to a factor which
is increasingly incorporated into all major western public and pri-
vate allocations. Most western states have some form of direct in-
stream use mechanisms, and others are considering them.'24 The
task now facing western water lawyers is to devise the legislative,
administrative, and judicial standards for the recognition of these
uses, and to establish on a state-by-state basis the allocation of
institutional responsibility for preservation flow establishment.
This can be done by confining recognition to public agencies acting
pursuant to precise delegations of power. States should consider
standards that vary according to the purpose of the flow preserva-
tion reservation. Fish and wildlife maintenance flows can be based
on somewhat technical criteria, whereas flow reservations for aes-
thetic enhancement above and beyond fish and wildlife mainte-
nance cannot. Thus an agency might have to meet a higher burden
of justification for the second kind of reservation. The authority to
protect instream flows should be accompanied by a charge to incor-
porate instream uses into all major water planning and allocation
decisions at the earliest stages. A final decision to withdraw waters,
however, should only be made after the maximum feasible informa-
tion on the environmental needs for the withdrawal and its oppor-
tunity cost have been collected and assessed. This will-not be easy.
As the great western novelist, Wallace Stegner and his son Page
recently observed in their survey of the Rocky Mountain Region:
"Among the forces bent on resource exploitation, the forces bent on
preservation of wilderness, the forces panting for escape from in-
dustrial cities, and the forces determined to bring art and ideas into
the isolated and half-educated hinterlands, the future will be ham-
mered out. The noise is going to be something to hear.' ' 25
123. WATER PoLIcY REVmw, NATIONAL WATER REsouRcEs POICY STUDY (Nov. 11, 1977)
(working drafts of the Task Force Reports).
124. E.g., Wyo. STAT. § 41-1.12 to .17 (Supp. 1975).
125. Stegner & Stegner, Rocky Mountain Country, ATLArmc, April 1978, at 45.
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